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During the 1980s, many developing countries such as Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Uruguay
experienced an increase in income inequality in favor of skilled workers and an increase in the relative
demand for skilled labor, i.e. skill upgrading (Robbins (1996)). Growing demand for skilled workers and
increased income inequality based on workers' skills present a particularly severe problem for societies
in developing countries: they precipitate the negative social consequences associated with higher initial
poverty levels and income disparities. Since little is known about the sources of skill upgrading in
developing countries, this paper investigates the relationship between growing demand for skilled labor,
investment, imported materials, and technology adoption using plant level data in Chile.
This study is motivated by two issues. First, the relationship between skill upgrading and plant
investment, use of imported materials, and technology adoption may be important to understanding
growing income inequality in many less developed countries. Several well documented facts suggest that
less developed countries have experienced an upward shift in their relative demands for skilled workers.
First, income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers increased in countries such as Mexico,
Chile, and Costa Rica after trade liberalization (Harrison and Hanson (1995, 1999, 1999a), Revenga
(1997), Robbins (1995, 1996)). Second, most of the worker reallocation occurred within rather than
across industries (Harrison and Hanson (1995), Robbins (1995, 1996)). Moreover, the share of skilled
labor in total industry employment increased concurrently with an increase in the skill-premium
(Harrison and Hanson (1995), Robbins (1995, 1996)). These patterns cannot be explained by the
strengthening of product-level import competition from developed countries after trade liberalizations.1
I would like to thank Eric Edmonds, Gene Grossman, Penny Goldberg, Bo Honore and the participants at the
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1Increasedexposure to trade from relatively skilled-labor abundant developed countries should, through product
demand changes, decrease relative wages of the skilled workers and lead to workers reallocation acrossindustries.
Hanson and Harrison (1999a) provide an appealing product-market based explanation for the increased income
inequality in Mexico. They show that industries that employed unskilled labor relatively intensively had higher rates
of protection before trade liberalization. Therefore, by Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the decrease in price of the
goods that are relatively unskilled labor intensive, should lead to increased income inequality based on skills. This
explanations, however, still does not account for the lack of reallocation of labor across industries, and the
concurrent rise in skill premium and employment share of skilled workers.
2Although these labor market changes have been well documented, only two studies reviewed later (on
Mexico) attempt to explain the sources of increased within industry relative demand for skilled workers
in less developed countries.
A second motivation for my study is to explore whether skill upgrading that is related to plant
investment, use of imported materials, and technology adoption occurs in all plants within an industry or
whether it only occurs in a specific set of plants. The recent industrial organization literature emphasizes
the importance of plant heterogeneity within industries (Olley and Pakes (1996), Roberts and Tybout
(1996)). Yet, most studies on skill upgrading in developed countries rely on industry or individual
worker level data. They obtain a positive correlation between skill upgrading and various measures of
technology use, but they cannot distinguish whether skill upgrading is a general phenomena or whether it
takes place only in certain plants within an industry.2 On the other hand, a study by Doms, et. al. (1997)
based on U.S. plant level panel data finds no evidence that the adoption of new technology is skill-biased
after controlling for plant fixed effects. My plant level data presents a good setting to investigate the
sources of skill upgrading in the case of Chile. The data provide information on plant ownership
structure and workforce characteristics allowing me to control for plant-specific characteristics that could
be driving the cross-sectional correlation between skill upgrading and various technology measures.
Growing income inequality in Chile has been documented before. Using household data from
1957 to 1992, Robbins (1995) shows first that, most of the growing income inequality between skill
groups stems from demand rather than supply shocks to the labor market and second, that increases in the
relative demand for skilled workers occurred within industries. He concludes that skill biased
technological change might explain the observed patterns. Unfortunately, household data do not provide
the direct measures of technology and detailed industry classification necessary to examine this issue
2Severalstudies on the United States obtain a positive link between skill upgrading and investment in R & D
(Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Bernard and Jones (1999), Machin and Van Reenen (1998)), the use of
computers at work (Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Autor, et. al. (1998)), exporting (Bernard and Jones
(1999)), and outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson (1996)). Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Machin and Van
Reenen (1998) confirm these results for a large group of developed countries.
3closer. I therefore use plant-level data to explore this demand shift further. The Chilean data provide
information on a plant's capital and investment, imported materials, foreign technical assistance, and the
use of patented technology, if these measures are associated with new technologies that are skill-biased,
they could contribute to the increasing demand for skilled workers.
To address the topic, I first compare the distribution of the relative share of skilled workers
employed in plants with and without new investment, imported materials, and new technologies using a
semiparametric methodology developed by DiNardo, et. al. (1996). Working with the entire distribution
of the share of skilled workers in plants allows me to explore differences across plants that are not
apparent when focusing on means or medians. One can, for example, observe where in the distribution
of plants new investment and technology exert the biggest influence. Second, I consider skill upgrading
by deriving a plant's demand for skilled labor in the context of a cost function. Finally, I specify a
production function to derive the reduced form for relative plant-level employment and relate
employment to plant characteristics. th the parametric part of my analysis, I allow plants that invest or
use technology to employ a different mix of workers than plants that do not. A difficulty with the
interpretation of the results in skill upgrading literature is that the variables representing skill biased
technology could simply proxy for an omitted plant characteristic that affects relative demand for skilled
labor and a plant's choice of technology use. I exploit the available data to control for plant-specific
characteristics such as financial constraints and workforce composition other than skill that could affect
plant technology and hiring decisions but have not been explicitly considered in previous studies.
thcreases in the relative demand for skilled workers could be driven by several factors. First,
firm demand for skilled workers might increase as a result of higher firm investment if capital and skilled
labor are complements. Firms could invest more into new machinery and equipment if increased foreign
competition forces them to improve their production process or they are able to import previously
unavailable machinery from abroad. For example, the imports of machinery and equipment rose from
US$267 to US$797 million from 1975 to 1981 after trade liberalization in Chile (Edwards and Edwards
4(1987)). Second, increased income inequality in many developed countries may stem from skill-biased
technological change (Author and Katz (1998), Berman, Bound, and Machin (l998)). Adoption of skill-
biased technology could also explain the growing demand for skilled labor in developing countries.
Lower trade barriers expedite this process. Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1997) model how the benefits of
innovation spread from one country to another through diffusion of technology or through the exchange
of goods. They find that the impact of diffusion of knowledge on productivity depends on the proximity
of a country to the technology source, tariff levels, and the flexibility of the domestic labor force. if the
adoption of new technology requires relatively more skilled labor, technology adoption could explain the
increase in the relative demand for skilled workers within industries in developing countries.
The existing studies of skill upgrading in less developed countries have mostly considered the
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a channel for the spread of technology across countries.
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Hanson and Harrison (1999) find a positive link between FDI and skill
upgrading in Mexico. Yet, the evidence on the relationship between the adoption of new technology,
investment, or imported materials and skill upgrading independent of FDI is weaker. Hanson and
Harrison (1999) find that firms obtaining technology through licensing agreements and import materials
hire more skilled workers. However, Hanson and Harrison (1999) obtain a negative or insignificant
relationship for other measures of investment and technology change.
th this study, I find a positive relationship between skill upgrading and imported materials,
foreign technical assistance, and patent use. Moreover, I find evidence of capital-skill complementarity:
the capital intensity of a plant is positively correlated with skill upgrading across all specifications. The
increasing average investment of Chilean manufacturing plants during my sample could partially explain
the growing demand for skilled labor in Chile. A positive correlation between other measures of
technology and skill upgrading is robust to controls for plant heterogeneity and plant random effects, but
This literature continues to disagree whether the labor demand shifts that changed the structure of wages resulted
from the increased exposure to imports from developing countries, skill-biased technical change, or outsourcing.
5the positive correlation becomes statistically insignificant when I account for unobserved plant
heterogeneity with plant fixed effects. This might suggest that only certain plants acquire technology
through patents, import materials, or use foreign technical assistance and these plants employ relatively
more skilled workers before and after the use of these measures of technology. Nevertheless, my results
continue to hold when I control for a plant's financial constraints and its workforce characteristics other
than skills. These variables are often mentioned as unobserved or omitted factors that could be driving
the cross-sectional correlations between technology use and skill upgrading in previous studies.
The next section describes the country's background, data, and presents descriptive and
semiparametric evidence. Section 3 introduces a cost function approach to skill upgrading and discusses
the estimation results. Section 4 addresses skill upgrading using a production function framework and
discusses the estimation results. Section 5concludes.
2. Country background, data and semiparametric evidence
2.1 Country background, data, and descriptive evidence
Chile presents an interesting setting to study the relationship between skill upgrading, new
investment, and technology. As I show later, from 1979 to 1986 the share of skilled workers in total
manufacturing employment increased by 16.8%. At the same time, the skill premium (measured as the
ratio of average annual wage of skilled labor to average annual wage of unskilled labor) grew by 10.6%.
These increases followed a trade liberalization. Between 1974 to 1979 Chile eliminated most of its non-
tariff barriers and reduced tariff rates from more than 100% in 1974 to a uniform across industries 10%
ad valorem tariff in 1979 (Dornbusch, et. al. (1994)). Its commitment to free trade persisted during the
1980s, except for a transitory period of increased tariff protection starting in 1983 in response to the
1982-1983 recession. These temporary measures peaked in 1984, when tariffs increased uniformly to
35%.However,Chile did not introduce non-tariff barriers, and tariffs declined to a 20% ad-valorem
level in mid 1985 (UNCTAD, 1992). As a result of significant tariff reductions and elimination of non-
Katz and Autor (1998) provide an overview of the labor studies, while Slaughter (1998) summarizes the work that
6tariff barriers to trade, the relative prices of imported technology decreased. The anecdotal evidence
suggests that many firms benefited from the ability to upgrade their machinery and intermediate materials
with purchases from abroad. Descriptive statistics presented at the end of this section based on the
Census of Manufacturers' support the anecdotal evidence.
This paper draws on a census of Chilean manufacturing plants that employ ten or more workers.
The data were collected by Chile's National Institute of Statistics from 1979 to 1986. The data contain
observations on 4547 plants and a total of 26,513 plant-year observations. The unit of observation in the
data is a plant, not a firm. Over 90% of the plants, however, are single-plant firms. The data set, the
variable definitions, and the variable construction are described in detail in Liu (1993) and Tybout
(l996). Capital, investment, imported materials, value added, expenditures on patents and rights, and
the expenditure on foreign technical assistance are expressed in constant 1980 pesos. The census
distinguishes between production and nonproduction workers, and it additionally decomposes each of
these two categories into white-collar and blue-collar workers. I measure skilled (white-collar) and
unskilled (blue-collar) labor by the total number of employees in each skill group working in a plant.
The data do not provide information on hours worked. For every plant, I obtain a wage for skilled
(unskilled) workers by dividing the total wage bill for a given skill group by the number of employees in
that skill group.
The data provide several plant-level variables to measure technology: imported materials,
expenditures on patent use and rights, and expenditures on foreign technical assistance. I depict these
variables in two ways. First, I create indicator variables for whether a plant receives foreign technical
assistance, pays for patent use, or imports a portion of its materials. Second, I express foreign technical
focuses on trade and product price related explanations.
I use the records from 4547 plants after eliminating those with incomplete information. The capital variable was
initially constructed using a perpetual inventory method by Liu (1993) and is described in detail in Tybout (1996). I
have reconstructed the variable so that the capital stock at time t does not contain investment at time t. Since the
balance sheet information was only available for the plants in 1980 and 1981, capital measures are based on the book
value of capital in those two periods. In my capital variable, I use figures based on the 1981 book value of capital if
7assistance cost as a share of value added, patent cost as a share of value added, and imported materials as
a share of total materials. The second definition controls for disparities in the use of the technology
measures across plants of different sizes. The findings in the paper are robust to both definitions of the
variables. Of course, these technology measures are not ideal. Nevertheless, they provide more insight
into the relationship between technology and skill upgrading than aggregate industry level data, since one
can observe specific technology that is used by workers in a given plant. Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics. Plants employ on average almost three times more unskilled than skilled workers, but the
wages of skilled workers are more than double those of unskilled workers. Plants also differ significantly
in their use of technology measures. Standard deviations are very high relative to the means of these
variables.
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics on employment and wages in Chilean manufacturing
plants. The plants underwent some significant changes from 1979 to 1986. The average share of skilled
workers in plant employment increased 16.8% and the average wagebill share of skilled workers grew
15%. At the same time, the skill premium (measured as the ratio of average annual wage of skilled
workers to average annual wage of unskilled workers) grew by 10.6%. The concurrent rise in the skill
premium and the relative employment of skilled workers is consistent with an upward shift in the relative
demand for skilled workers during the early 1980s in Chile. Table 3 reports whether this shift occurred
mostly within or between four digit ISIC industries.5 As is standard in the literature, the change in the
share of skilled workers in total employment (weighted by the share of industry employment in total
employment) AS can be decomposed into within and between industry shifts:
=S
—S=L ASE+ LAEs
both1980 and 1981 are available. Otherwise, capital measure based on the 1980 book value of capital was used. I
experimented with several options and all capital measures are highly correlated.
Four-digit ISIC industry classification yields 84 industry categories.
8whereis the share of industry i's employment in total employment at time t,s isthe share of skilled
workers in total employment in industry i, E =.5(E + E) ,ands =•5(+s). The first and second
term represent the shifts in the employment of skilled workers within and between industries,
respectively. A similar decomposition can be obtained for the wagebill share of skilled workers. The
decomposition results are reported in table 3. From 1979 to 1986 87% of the shift in the share of skilled
workers in total manufacturing employment occurred within industries. Similarly, when the
decomposition is based on the wagebill share of skilled workers, 64% of the shift occurred within
industries. These within industry shifts are consistent with capital-deepening and skill-biased
technological change. Have Chilean manufacturing plants invested more and used new technology?
Table 4 summarizes the use of various technology measures and investment. Between 1979 and 1986 an
increasing share of plants used foreign technical assistance, patents, and imported materials. The average
expenditure on foreign technical assistance and the use of imported materials rose in real terms. The
imported materials represented a growing proportion of total materials, and on average plants increased
their investments.
2.2 Technology and the distribution of the employment of skilled workers across plants
Tables 2-4 provide suggestive evidence that Chile experienced skill upgrading at the same time
as plants invested more heavily, and increased the use of imported materials, patented technology, and
foreign technical assistance. That evidence relies on the means of these variables and might mask the
differences in the impact of technology variables on plants that employ different shares of skilled
workers. Recent industrial organization literature has revealed the importance of heterogeneity of plants
within narrowly defined industry groups. To explore this heterogeneity, I examine the distribution of
relative demand for skilled workers measured by the wagebill share of skilled workers across plants. I
investigate whether technology measures impact plants in the entire distribution of plants by the same
extent, or whether they exert bigger impact on plants in particular parts of the distribution. In order to do
so, I compare the distribution of wagebill share of skilled workers in plants that use imported materials
9(or invest, receive foreign technical assistance, use patented technology) to the distribution of wagebill
share of skilled workers in plants that do not.
Suppose that a vector of plant's characteristics x, its wagebill share of skilled workers s, and an
indicator for whether a plant uses technology T have a joint distribution F(s, x, T). The density of
relative demand for workers conditional on whether a plant uses a particular technology can be written as
(1) fT(s)=JdF(sxIT=J)f(sIT=J)
wherej is one if plant uses technology T and 0 otherwise. This density can be estimated with a kernel
density function:
fh= K(5t)1(T =I)
whereh is the bandwidth, KQ is a kernel function, 10 is an indicator function whether a plant uses
technology T, and n1 is the number of plants that use technology T (n1 =L1(T=j)). Figurela shows
the kernel density of the logarithm of the wagebill share of skilled workers for plants that do and do not
use technology T. The indicator T is one if a plant invested, used imported materials, patented
technology, and received foreign technical assistance at least one year from 1979 to 1986 and zero
otherwise. The heterogeneity in the wagebill share of skilled labor across plants is striking. Moreover,
the density for the plants that use these technology measures lies to the right of the density for plants that
do not. This implies that the probability of observing a higher share of skilled workers (skill upgrading)
is greater for plants that invest, use imported materials, foreign technical assistance, and patented
technology. Figure 2compareskernel densities for plants that do and do not use a particular technology
in their production process. For example, the indicator T is one if a plant uses imported materials at least
one year from 1979 to 1986 and zero otherwise(and similarly for other measures). The conclusions are
the same. The mass of density for the plants that use imported materials, make new investments, use
10foreign technical assistance, or patents is to the right of the mass of density for the plants without the
respective measure.
The above comparisons, however, ignore that plants that do or do not use technology might also
differ in other characteristics. The difference in density of wagebill share of skilled workers might either
be a result of the use of technology, or a result of the differing characteristics between the plants in the
two groups. For example, if plants that use imported materials are also more capital intensive, and
capital is complementary to skilled workers, I observe a difference in density of wagebill share of skilled
workers regardless of the use of imported materials. In order to separate the two effects, I need to obtain
the counterfactual distribution of the wagebill share of skilled workers for the plants that do not use
imported materials that would have prevailed if these plants had the same other observable characteristics
as the plants that use imported materials, if the difference between the counterfactual density of plants
without technology and the actual density of plants with technology persists, then the technology
measures seem to impact skill upgrading. Methodology proposed by DiNardo, et. al. (1996) enables such
a counterfactual comparison. The basic idea behind the creation of the counterfactual density for the
plants that do not use technology is to attach a greater importance (a larger weight) to plants without
technology that better match the characteristics of the plants with technology.
Let f(si T=0)be the density of the wagebill share of skilled workers for plants that do not use
technology T, but have the same characteristics x1 as the plants that use technology T. Using (1), this
yields:
IT=0)=Lf(I x,T=0)dF(x IT =1)
=Jf(s I x,T =O)W(x)dF(xIT =0)
dF(xIT= 1) where ¶1' (x) is a reweighing function. Given an estimate of this reweighing function, I X
dF(xIT=0)
can obtain the estimate of counterfactual density by rewriting a kernel density function as:
11s(s) =_LqJ(x)K(5)1(T =0)
nh tE￿ h
where n is the number of plants that do not use technology T. The reweighing function W weighs the
data by assigning a larger weight to plants that do not use technology T that better match the
characteristics of the plants that use technology T. DiNardo, et. al. (1996) show that an estimate of the






Pr(T= 1) is the unconditional probability that a plant uses technology T. I estimate Pr(T= 1 Ix=x) by a
Probit model with regressor vector x. I include the following plant characteristics as regressors: two-
digit ISIC industry indicators, area indicators, indicators for capital quartiles, indicators for value added
quartiles, and year indicators.
Figure lb illustrates the counterfactual kernel density for the plants that do not use technology T
and the actual densities from Figure la.6 The counterfactual density lies between the actual density of
the plants without technology T and the actual density of the plants using technology T. This suggests
that part of the difference in the relative demand for skilled labor between the two types of plants stems
from variation in other plant characteristics across the two groups. The mass of the actual density for
plants that use technology measures is to the right of the counterfactual density even after controlling for
other observable plant characteristics. The difference between the two densities measures the impact of
investment and technology on skill upgrading. The impact is quite striking in the middle and upper part
of the distribution, but technology does not exert much impact in the plants with relatively low share of
skilled workers. Figure 3 depicts counterfactual densities for plants that do not use a particular
technology measure and suggests similar findings as Figure lb. The use of imported inputs and patented
6Thetechnology indicator T is defined the same as for Figure la.
12technology affects the whole distribution (except for the lowest tail). The effect of foreign technical
assistance is very noticeable in the part of the distribution of plants with shares of skilled workers higher
than .13 (ln(. 1 3)=-2),butis negligible in plants that employ lower shares of skilled workers. The impact
of new investment is pronounced mostly in plants in the middle section of the distribution, and
diminishes for higher shares of skilled workers. Overall, these results show that various technology
measures exert differential effect on skill upgrading over the distribution of plants.
This methodology has two drawbacks that should be considered when interpreting the results.
First, it does not take into account the general equilibrium effects (or spillover effects) of the use of
foreign technical assistance, patents on relative demand for skilled labor. For example, use of foreign
technical assistance in a plant could increase demand for skilled labor in all plants if there exist
spillovers. Second, the methodology assumes that conditional on the observed characteristics, the
placement of imported materials (or investment, foreign technical assistance, patented technology) is
random across plants. I do not account for unobservable plant characteristics that might impact
placement of technology as well as skill upgrading. Plants that use imported materials could simply be
plants with some unobserved characteristic that leads them to hire more skilled workers, or they might
employ different type of workers than plants without imported materials. I address these concerns in the
next two sections of the paper when I approach the topic more parametrically.
3. Cost Function Analysis
Previous section of the paper provided preliminary evidence on the positive relationship between
increased relative demand for skilled labor and various technology measures across the distribution of
plants. In this section, I address this topic parametrically by using a restricted variable translog cost
function approach, which provides a way to relate plant characteristics to a plant's relative demand for
skilled labor (skill upgrading).7 The use of translog cost function is very appealing because it provides a
'Thisapproach has been used widely in recent studies of skill upgrading (Berman, Bound, Griliches (1994),
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), Doms et. al (1997), Machin and VanReenen(1998) among others).
13second order approximation to any cost function and it does not impose any restrictions on the
substitutability of various inputs. th particular, I consider a restricted variable cost function form:
inC(ws,wu,Y,K,T)=ao+ainws+ainwu +aYinY+akinK+afT
(in ws)(in wu) +(inws )2
+y(inwu)(in ws) +y(in wu)2}
(2)
+.5 (y (in Y)2 +y(in K)2 + yffT2)+ y(in Y)in(ws)
+y(in Y)(in wu) +y(inK)(in ws)+ Yku (in K)(in wu)
+yT(in ws) +yT(inwu) +y(inY)T +Yk(inK)T
where C is a variable cost, ws and wu are wages of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively, Y is value
added, K is capital, and T stands for technology. This framework differs from the general cost function
specification because it assumes that capital and other technology measures Tare fixed while skilled and
unskilled labor are variable factors in the considered time period. Using cost minimization I obtain cost
share equations of variable inputs by partially differentiating (2) with respect to input prices.
After imposing homogeneity of degree one in prices to ensure that the cost function corresponds to some
well-behaved production function, the wagebill share equation for skilled labor can be written as:
in(ws) in(K) Shares =a+y +yy in(Y)+J3Tech+E
in(w ) in(Y)
where the notation follows the previous notation in the paper. Technology term T is decomposed into
directly observed technology measures vector Tech, and an unobserved component .
Estimationof the cost share equation relies on several assumptions. First, the previous literature
assumes that capital and value added can be treated as variables not affected by the current wagebill
share of skilled workers. th this paper, capital is constructed so that investment at time t does not enter
capital until t+ 1. Therefore, not only can I assume that the share of current skilled workers does not
affect the capital stock, but also capital is not affected by unobserved shocks that affect the wagebill
14share of skilled workers.8 Moreover, value added is likely a function of the share of skilled workers
employed in a plant. To mitigate this problem, I also estimate the cost share equation using lagged value
added rather than the current value added.9 The findings are robust and similar in both cases.
Additionally, in section 4 of the paper I investigate skill upgrading based on a production function
approach that does not rely on the assumption that value added is unaffected by the share of the skilled in
the work force.
Second, I include area, four-digit ISIC industry, and time indicators in the regressions. These
variables, for example, control for variation in the plant's wages based on area, industry, and time
specific shocks to the labor market. As previous studies in the literature I do not include direct measures
of plant level wages. The previous literature justifies the exclusion by the fact that most of the variation
in relative wages across plants is endogenous (related to the different skill mixes of workers across
plants).1° Time and area indicators also control for other unobserved shocks that are common for all
plants in a given year or area. The actual estimation equation for a plant i that belongs to industry j at
time t therefore becomes:
(3)Share =a +Yk
1n(K1)+ y1n(1)+ P Tech1 + 8Year + ØArea1 + Mnd1 +
where Year is a vector of year indicators, Area is an indicator that denotes the location of a plant, and md
is a four-digit ISIC industry indicator. In part of the estimation, I also allow the coefficients on the
capital to value added and value added to vary by industry. I do not impose constant returns to scale
8Inthis paper, I abstract from dynamic issues, in particular the issue of the exit of plants. Pavcnik (1999) shows that
many plants exited in Chile during this time period. In unreported regressions that estimate the above relationship, I
have included an indicator for plant exit. Conditional on other variables, the wagebill share of skilled workers is not
statistically significantly higher or lower for the plants that exit. However, if the probability of exit depends on
unobserved, skill biased shocks and is a function of a plant's capital, estimation based on surviving plants could lead
to a downward bias on the coefficient of capital. Therefore it would make it more difficult to find capital-skilled
labor complementarity.
The regression results using current value added (tables 5, 6, 7) and lagged value added are similar. I therefore
focus on the results using current value added. Results from regressions using lagged value added are reported in the
appendix tables 3-6.
'°This treatment of wages is a shortcoming of the cost based approach to skill upgrading. In section 4, I derive a
reduced form for the relative plant-level employment of the skilled that does not suffer from this problem.
15because value added enters in addition to the capital to value added ratio. If the coefficient on the value
added variable ç is not significantly different from zero, I fail to reject the constant returns to scale
hypothesis. if capital is complementary to skilled workers, the coefficient on the capital to value added
ratio Yk should be positive. If technology measures are skill biased, the components of the coefficient
vector /3 should be positive.
Estimation results are reported in tables 5,6,and 7. All regressions include four digit ISIC
industry indicators so that the coefficients on the variables are identified by the variation in independent
variables within industries.11 All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White
correction. I perform the analysis with two dependent variables--the wagebill share of skilled workers
and the share of skilled workers in total plant employment. Because both yield similar results, I
concentrate my discussion on the wage bill regressions. The results for the regressions using the share of
skilled workers in total employment as dependent variable are reported in appendix tables 1 and 2. Table
5reportsregression results where technology variables are depicted as indicators for whether a plant
receives foreign technical assistance, pays for use of patented technology, or imports a portion of its
materials. Table 6 uses the alternative definition that is based on the expenditure on foreign technical
assistance (or patents) as a share of value added and the share of imported materials in total plant
materials. Since the results are similar in both cases, I focus my discussion on Table 5.
Ascolumn 1 shows, I find evidence of skill upgrading related to investment and technology
measures. First, the coefficient on capital to value added ratio is positive and significantly different from
zero in all cases. This indicates that capital is complementary to skilled labor: within an industry,
holding other plant characteristics constant, plants that add additional capital also employ a higher share
of skilled workers. Second, plants using foreign technical assistance, patented technology, and imported
materials have a higher share of skilled workers in their wage bill: all the coefficients are positive and
I have also performed the analysis for individual two digit ISIC industries separately (effectively allowing for a
different cost function for all industries). The findings were essentially the same as in the pooled results discussed
here.
16significantly different from zero. Moreover, there is evidence of increasing returns to scale: the
coefficient on value added is positive.
The estimation in table 7 allows the coefficients on the capital to value added ratio and value
added to vary by industry. As column 1 indicates, plants in all industries display capital-skill
complementarity and increasing returns to scale. Relative to food processing, capital-skill
complementarity is stronger in paper, glass, basic metals, and machinery industries, but is not statistically
different, for example, for plants in the textile industry. Allowing the coefficient on capital skill
complementarity to vary across industries does not affect the previous findings of skill upgrading related
to the use of foreign technical assistance, patented technology, and imported materials.12
Unlike in industry-level studies, the impact of skill upgrading in this paper is not identified by
the differences in the use of imported materials, patented technology, or foreign technical assistance
across industries. Rather, it is identified by the differences in the use of imported materials, patented
technology, or foreign technical assistance between firms within an industry. Still, there are potentially
two problems with interpretation of my findings. First, as most plant-level data studies, I do not have
much information regarding the labor composition in each plant. Therefore, the coefficients on the
variables such as foreign technical assistance, patents, and imported materials could simply capture that
plants that use these measures employ a different mix of workers than those without them. Second, the
variables representing skill biased technology could simply proxy for an omitted plant characteristic that
affects relative demand for skilled labor and a plant's choice of technology use. For example, plants
might differ in their ability to finance new investments, foreign technical assistance, patented technology,
and imported materials. Their financial situation might also affect their ability to attract skilled workers.
To capture the effect of omitted plant characteristic, I estimate equation (3) first, using plant
random effects, and second, using plant fixed effects.13 Equations such as (3) are often estimated in
difference form (first and long differences) in industry-level studies. Fixed effects estimation is in
121havealso allowed for industry specific coefficients on the latter variables, but the results were not informative.
17principle analogous to differencing the data (exactly the same with two time periods).14 It identifies the
impact of the variable of interest solely with the intertemporal variation in the variable within a plant. It
then eliminates the impact of any omitted time-invariant plant characteristics. Finding any correlation
between variables of interest with this methodology is highly unlikely. First, fixed effects estimation
exacerbates any measurement error problems and attenuates the coefficients on mismeasured variables
toward zero. It is therefore much more reliable with better measured variables. Second, since it relies on
within plant variation in a variable, it is more effective with a longer panel. Finally, most of the relevant
variation in technology variables and the wagebill share of skilled labor might actually occur across
rather than within plants in a given industry. My previous findings are robust to random effects
estimation reported in column 2 of table 5.Notsurprisingly, as column 3 of table 5indicates,most of the
coefficients become insignificantly different from zero in plant fixed effects estimation. Surprisingly, the
fixed effects estimates confirm capital skill complementarity. Overall, since the capital-skill
complementarity is based solely on the within plant variation, the above results suggests that plants that
invested during the 1980s increased their relative demand for skilled labor over time.
It is impossible to identify whether the lack of correlation between skill upgrading and imported
materials, patented technology, and foreign technical assistance is driven by the actual lack of
relationship, the lack of within plant variation, or measurement error. The correlation between
technology variables and skill upgrading disappears also in studies using plant level data from the United
States sets (Doms et. al (1997)) if one relies only on within plant variation. Nevertheless, the lack of
significant correlation between skill upgrading and technology measures using fixed effects might also
suggest that only very particular plants decide to use imported materials, patented technology, or foreign
technical assistance. These are also the plants that in general employ relatively more skilled workers
before and after the adoption. These results suggest that future work should focus on trying to look
13TheHausman test rejects the hypothesis that the error is uncorrelated with the independent variables.
141haveestimated (3) in first and long differences, but the exercise did not yield different conclusions from those in
the fixed effects estimation. Therefore, I focus on fixed effects results.
18either at a longer time horizon or on finding instruments for the technology measures in order to solve the
measurement error problem. The latter is notoriously difficult.
Given these caveats regarding fixed effects estimates, it might be attractive to consider
alternative ways of controlling for "unobserved" plant characteristics such as workforce composition and
financial situation. Chilean data decomposes skilled workers (white-collar) into administrators,
executives, and production workers, and unskilled workers (blue-collar) into production and
nonproduction workers. It also separates total plant employment by gender. th order to address the
problem of plants employing different types of workers, I include regressors that provide more
information on the composition of the workforce at the plant level. Column 4 of table 5presentsthe
results of a regression that controls for the share of skilled workers that are executives, the share of
skilled workers that are administrators, the share of female employees in total plant employment, and the
share of production workers in total plant employment. The magnitude of the coefficients on the
technology variables decreases, but their impact on skill upgrading remains statistically significant. The
coefficient on capital to output ratio is also reduced in magnitude, but remains highly significant.
Similarly, I can control for the problem that a plant's financial situation might impact its
decisions to invest, import materials, use patented technology, or foreign technical assistance, as well as
its ability to attract skilled workers. A plant's ownership structure might be a good indicator of its
financial constraints. I control for a plant's financial situation by an indicator whether a plant is or
belongs to a corporation. Columns 5and6 of table S report the coefficients from regressions that control
for both worker characteristics and plant's ownership structure using OLS and random effects estimation,
respectively. Except for patents, the previous findings are robust to the inclusion of these controls. As
before, the inclusion of the corporation indicator diminishes the magnitude of all coefficients.
The finding of positive relationship between skill upgrading and imported materials and foreign
technical assistance, after I account for various plant characteristics that were not controlled for in
previous studies, has two implications. Since the magnitudes of the coefficients measuring the impact of
19various technology measures on skill upgrading decline, my results suggest that characteristics such as a
plants' financial constraints do account for part of cross-sectional correlation between skill upgrading
and technology use within an industry. They also provide several possible explanations for the
differences in the adoption of technology across plants within an industry that should continue to be
incorporated in future research.
4. Production function Analysis
The cost function approach assumes that plants face exogenous factor prices and choose factor
quantities. th order to find links between plant level relative demand for skilled workers and plant level
measures of technology, I specify a production function and assume that plants hire inputs to maximize
profits. Suppose that output for plant i in industry jattime t can be written as:
(4) =
whereLs and Lu are skilled and unskilled employment, K is capital, Tech is a vector with variables that
indicate a plant's use of foreign technical assistance, imported materials, or patents, and Z is a vector of
characteristics such as a year indicator, industry indicator, and the location of a plant. Let us assume that
plants set workers' wages equal to their marginal revenue product of labor. This yields a factor demand




whereIY(w") and I](WS)representlabor supply for unskilled and skilled workers, respectively and Pj is
the price of product produced in industry j.Bysubstituting in the relationship for the labor supply (for
example, an alternative wage in an industry and a region) and rearranging the equation, I obtain a reduced
form expression for the employment of the two skill groups:
20LS =f(K,altwu,altw,Tech;Z)*p1
F' =fu(K,altwu,altw,T6th;Z)*pj
where altWandaltW' are the alternative wage for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Log
linearizing the relationship yields the following reduced form for the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers
employed at a given plant:
(5) 1n() =y+ ak1n(K)+ au 1n(alvj7) + a1n(alvjts)+$Tech + ØZ +
The coefficient on the capital ak shows the impact of capital on the ratio of employment of the skilled to
unskilled labor. If it is positive, it suggests that capital and skilled labor are complements. If the
components of coefficient vector /3 on technology measures are not significantly different from zero, the
evidence is consistent with foreign technical assistance, imported materials, and use of patented
technology affecting productivity of skilled and unskilled workers symmetrically (Hicks neutral
technology) or not impacting them at all. On the other hand, one could interpret a positive (negative)
coefficient /3 as consistent with these measures representing technological progress that is relatively skill
biased (unskilled biased).
Tables 8 and 9 report the regression results of estimating equation (5). All regression
specifications control for four-digit ISIC industry, year, and area indicators.15 All the results confirm my
previous findings from the cost based approach. Capital is complementary to skilled labor in production
in all specifications of the regression. The use of foreign technical assistance, patented technology, and
imported materials is positively correlated with the relative employment of skilled workers. The
coefficients are still positive and significant when I control for worker characteristics, plant ownership,
and when I use plant random effects. As in the cost-function analysis, except for the capital-skilled labor
'5Mlregressionsalso include plant size indicators (plants are divided into four quartiles based on the size of their
labor force). I estimate (5) with and without inclusion of alternative wages. By construction (alternative wage is
defined as the mean wage in an industry in a given area excluding the wage of a firm in question), these wages are
highly correlated with the left hand side wage components from other firms and enter the equation significantly.
21complementarity, my findings are not robust to the inclusion of plant fixed effects. Finally, table 10
reports the regression results of estimating (5)allowingfor industry variation in the coefficient on
capital. Positive relationship between skill upgrading and foreign technical assistance, patents, and
imported materials continues to hold. Although all industries exhibit capital-skill complementarity, the
complementarity is more pronounced in paper, chemicals, glass, basic metals, and machinery than food
processing.
5.Conclusion
This paper finds that the use of imported materials, foreign technical assistance, and patented
technology has contributed to skill upgrading in Chilean plants during the 1980s. Moreover, plants with
more capital employ relatively more skilled workers. Since average plant investment increased in
Chilean manufacturing plants during the 1980s, capital-deepening could additionally contribute to the
growing relative demand for skilled workers. The relationship between skill upgrading and investment,
the use of imported materials, and foreign technical assistance is likely to continue to be an important
topic. During the 1990s, an increasing number of developing countries embarked on trade liberalization
process and trade barriers between developed and developing countries declined after the Uruguay round
of GATT negotiations. These trade developments might encourage more technology transfers that favor
relatively skilled labor in less developed countries. Quantifying the impact of this additional technology
transfers remains a topic for future research.
This paper complements the industry-level studies that cannot identify whether skill upgrading
related to technology use occurs in all plants within an industry or whether it is driven by a specific set of
firms. Semiparametric and parametric results suggest that plant heterogeneity is quite substantial. Like
in previous plant level analysis by Doms et.al. (1997) for the United States, the results for technology
measures other than capital are sensitive to the inclusion of plant fixed effects. The lack of significant
coefficients might be due simply to the fact that the fixed effects methodology relies on intertemporal
Their inclusion or exclusion does not affect the other coefficients in the regressions. I therefore only report the
22variation within plants. Yet, even if we found a positive link between skill upgrading and technology
measures, this might not be a causal relationship, especially in the long run. A recent theoretical model
by Acemoglu (1999) shows that increased demand for skilled labor can induce more skill biased
technological change.
Given the inherent problems with fixed effects estimation, plant-level data enable me to control
for part of the within industry plant heterogeneity by explicitly accounting for varying worker
characteristics and financial constraints across plants within an industry. With these controls, the
magnitude of the effects of technology variables on skill upgrading diminishes. However, the positive
relationship between skill upgrading and imported materials and foreign technical assistance persists.
This study thus illustrates that, to fully understand the process of technology adoption and how it relates
to skill upgrading in less developed countries, future work should continue to explore plant
characteristics such as financial constraints or managerial ability that affect a firm's ability to attract a
better workforce and adopt better technology from abroad.
regression results that include alternative wages as regressors.
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diamonds—plantswithout indicated technology;pluses—plants with indicated technology;solid line—reweighted densityTable 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean S.D.
Skilled Labor Wage 24,166 237 211
Unskilled Labor Wage 26,513 95 59
Skilled Workers 26,513 14 41
Unskilled Workers 26,513 41 86
Labor 26,513 56 120
Capital 26,513 54,429356,870
Investment 26,513 3,872 41,026
Value Added 26,513 53,504350,451
Foreign Technical Assistance (FTA) 26,513 295 3,647
Patent Use Cost 26,513 111 1,147
Imported Materials 26,513 16,771223,482
Corporation Indicator 26,513 0.19 0.40
Executives 26,513 2 5
Administrators 26,513 8 24
Skilled Production Workers 26,513 4 21
Production Workers 26,513 39 81
Number of Women in a Plant 26,513 11 28
Note: Quantities in thousands of 1980 pesos. Skilled labor, unskilled labor and labor are
measured in number of employees. The variable labor, but not the other two, also includes
owners of a plant. There are only 24,166 observations on skilled wage because some plants
do not employ any skilled workers. Source: Census of Manufacturers, Chilean National
Instititue of Statistics.Table 2
Skilled-Unskilled Lab or Composition
(plant averages)







1979 2.62 .299 .184
1980 2.51 .293 .183
1981 2.49 .298 .185
1982 2.59 .330 .206
1983 2.73 .337 .208
1984 2.78 .340 .207
1985 2.71 .339 .208
1986 2.89 .345 .215
t-statistic -2.3 10 -7.95 1 -8.247
p-value .011 .000 .000
Note: The reported T-statistic is for the t-test of the equality of the mean in
1979 and 1986 for respective variables. The reported P value is for the
alternative hypotesis Ha: 1986>1979. All quantities are in thousands of
constant 1980 pesos. Labor variables are expressed in number of workers.
Skill premium is the ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage. Reported
averages are simple (unweighted) means.
Table 3--Within and Between Industry Relative Labor Shifts 1979-1986
EmploymentShare of Skilled Workers Wage Bill Share of Skilled Workers
Total Within Between Total Within Between
1979-86 .016 .015 .002 .053 .035 .018
Note: Definition of the decomposition is given on pages 8 and 9 of the paper. Decomposition is based on four digit ISIC
industry classification. Employment share of skilled workers is weighted by the share of a four-digit ISIC industry employment
in total employment in a given year. Wagebill share of skilled workers is weighted by the share of a four-digit ISIC industry
wage bill in total wage bill in a given year.Table 4--Technology Developments
Year Plants thatPlants thatPlants withForeignPatent CostImportedImportedInvestment
use foreignUse PatentsImportedtechnical (mean)MaterialsMaterials as(mean)
technical (share) Materialsassistance (mean)a share of
assistance (share) cost Total
(share) (mean) Materials
(mean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1979 .049 .724 .257 276 139 14,032 .081 3,161
1980 .045 .711 .238 290 59 13,766 .080 3,850
1981 .041 .756 .254 222 135 14,708 .086 3,896
1982 .043 .731 .231 241 118 14,580 .079 4,752
1983 .042 .780 .247 275 117 17,897 .087 3,757
1984 .052 .790 .265 370 103 21,137 .095 2,666
1985 .052 .812 .273 368 105 21,684 .093 3,481
1986 .057 .830 .289 362 114 18,977 .098 5,642
t-statistic -1.448-10.094 -2.836 -.773 .609 -.925 -3.188 -2.966
p-value .074 .000 .002 .220 .729 .178 .001 .002
Note: Quantities are in thousands or 1980 Pesos. The reported T-statistic is for a test of the equality of the mean in 1979 and 1986
for respective variables. Reported P value is for the alternative hypothesis that Ha: 1986>1979.Table 5--Skill upgrading Regressions
(dependent variable is share of skilled workers in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital/Value added) .021 ** .027** .009** .014** .010** .016**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(Valueadded) .046 ** .035** .007** .030** .021** .019**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTAIndicator .021 ** .009** -.003 .017 ** .007* .007*
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
PatentIndicator .016 ** .005** .002 .005 ** .003 .000
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
ImportedMaterials .047 ** .014** -.003 .033 ** .023** .008**
Indicator (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Share of Executives -.078 ** -.076** -.070**
(.005) (.005) (.004)
Shareof Administrators -.103 ** -.098** -.073**
(.004) (.004) (.003)
Shareof Women .018 ** .023** .007
(.007) (.007) (.007)
Shareof Production -.370 **354** -.229**
Workers (.008) (.008) (.006)
Corporation Indicator .081 ** .082**
(.003) (.004)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .48 na .80 .53 .54 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level,
respectively. FTAstandsfor foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in
total employment of skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N
is 26,513. N is 24,166 in columns 3-5 because we cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share
of administators in total employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change
significantly in columns 1-3 if they are estimated using only 24,166 observations.Table 6--Skill upgrading regressions
(dependent variable is share of skilled workers in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital/Value added) .022 ** .027** .009** .015** .010** .016**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(Valueadded) .049 ** .035** .007** .032** .021** .019**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTACost/Value Added .196 ** .051* -.004 .133 ** .094* .007
(.063) (.033) (.028) (.054) (.046) (.004)
Patent Cost/Value Added .004 ** .002** .001** .002** .002** .000
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.002)
ImportedMat./Materials .087 ** .034** -.001 .064 ** .049** .008**
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.003)
Shareof Executives -.079 ** -.077** -.070**
(.005) (.005) (.004)
Shareof Administrators -.104 ** -.099** -.073**
(.004) (.004) (.003)
Shareof Women .018 ** .022** .007
(.007) (.007) (.007)
ShareofProduction -.372 **354** -.229**
Workers (.008) (.008) (.006)
Corporation Indicator .082 ** .082**
(.003) (.004)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .48 na .80 .53 .54 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5%and10% level, respectively.
FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment of
skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 26,513. N is 24,166
in columns 3-5 because we cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators in total
employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if they are
estimated using only 24,166 observations.Table 7--Skill upgrading regressions with industry interactions
(dependent variable is share of skilled workers in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(capital/Value Added) .017 ** .010** .014**
(.001) (.001) (.002)
ln(cap/Value Added)*textiles .003 -.004* .000
(.002) (.002) (.003)
ln(cap/Value Added)*wood -.002 -.005 * -.001
(.003) (.003) (.003)
ln(cap/Value Added)*paper .008 * - .002 .003
(.005) (.004) (.005)
ln(cap/Value Added)*chemicals -.004 -.009 ** -.005
(.003) (.003) (.003)
ln(cap/Value Added)*glass .011 ** .003 .006
(.005) (.005) (.005)
ln(cap/Value Added) *basjc metals .030 ** .022 .012 **
(.005) (.004) (.005)
ln(cap/Value Added)*machinery .013 ** .006** .006**
(.003) (.002) (.003)
ln(cap/Value Added)*other manuf. .028 ** .011 .014
(.007) (.007) (.009)
ln(Value Added) .043 ** .020** .016**
(.002) (.002) (.002)
ln(Value Added)*textiles .003 .001 .003
(.002) (.002) (.003)
ln(Value Added)*wood -.006 ** -.005** -.001
(.003) (.002) (.003)
ln(Value Added)*paper .016 ** .004 .010 **
(.004) (.003) (.004)
ln(Value Added)*chemicals .000 -.002 .003
(.003) (.003) (.004)
ln(Value Added)*glass .014 ** .008** .011**
(.004) (.004) (.005)
ln(Value Added) *basjc metals .008 * .008** .011**
(.004) (.004) (.005)
ln(Value Added)*machinery .012 ** .006** .005*
(.002) (.002) (.003)
ln(Value Added)*other manufacturing .017 ** .006 .017
(.007) (.007) (.010)
Note: This table continues on the next pageTable 7 continued--Skill upgrading regressions with industry interactions
(dependent variable is share of skilled workers in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3)
list of coefficient continued
FTAIndicator .019 ** .006 .006
(.005) (.005) (.004)
Patent Indicator .016 ** .003 .000
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Imported Material Indicator .045** .022** .008**
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Plant Random Effects no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .49 .54 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5% and
10% level, respectively. FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. Regressions in column 2
and 3 also include the following unreported regressors: share of executives and share of
administrators in total employment of skilled workers, share of women and share of production
workers in total employment, and a corporation indicator. N is 26,513 in columns 1 and 2, and
24,166 in column 3. N is 24,166 in column 3 because we cannot define additional variables such
as share of executives and share of administators in total employment of skilled workers for plants
without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-2 if they are estimated
using only 24,166 observations.Table 8--Employment ratio regressions
(dependent variable is ln( skilled to unskilled labor))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital) .091 ** .086** .029** .063** .050** .054**
(.004) (.005) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.004)
FTA Indicator .187 ** .067** .012 .114 ** .086** .048**
(.021) (.019) (.022) (.017) (.017) (.018)
Patent Indicator .067 ** .025** .016 .025 ** .019* .008
(.011) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.008)
ImportedMaterials .190 ** .052** -.011 .121 ** .091** .025**
Indicator (.012) (.011) (.013) (.011) (.011) (.010)
Share of Executives -.667 ** -.663** -.608**
(.023) (.023) (.018)
Share of Administrators -.583 ** -.569** -.490**
(.020) (.020) (.015)
Share of Woman .026 .041 .020
(.029) (.028) (.030)
Share of Production -2.137 **-2.092**-1.604**
Workers (.040) (.040) (.026)
Corporation Indicator .216 .232 **
(.012) (.018)
Plant Indicators no no yes no no yes
Plant Random Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .31 na .71 .46 .47 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level, respectively.
N is 24,166 because some firms do not report employing any skilled workers. FTA stands for foreign technical assistance.
Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment of skilled workers. Share of women and
production workers refers to their share in total employment. The regression also includes the following unreported
regressors: alternative wage for skilled workers, alternative wage for unskilled workers, plant size indicators based on the
quartiles of the employment distribution. The coefficients are available from author upon request.Table 9--Employment Ratio Regressions
(dependent variable is ln(skilled to unskilled labor))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital) .098 ** .087** .028** .066** .052** .055**
(.004) (.005) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.004)
FTA Cost/Value Added .680 ** .207 .086 .419 ** •335** .134
(.260) (.141) (.138) (.172) (.153) (.132)
Patent Cost/Value Added .009 .000 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.006
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.004)
ImportedMat./Materials .372 ** .108** -.029 .235 ** .186** .054**
(.027) (.025) (.027) (.022) (.022) (.023)
Share of Executives -.673 ** -.667** -.608**
(.024) (.023) (.018)
Share of Administrators -.588 ** -.572** -.490**
(.020) (.020) (.015)
Share of Woman .024 .040 .020
(.029) (.028) (.030)
Share of Production -2.153 **-2.100**-1.606**
Workers (.040) (.040) (.026)
Corporation Indicator .227 ** .236**
(.012) (.018)
Plant Indicators no no yes no no yes
Plant Random Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .31 na .71 .46 .47 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level, respectively. N is
24,166 because some firms do not report employing any skilled workers. FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. Share
of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment of skilled workers. Share of women and production
workers refers to their share in total employment. The regression also inculdes the following unreported regressors:
alternative wage for skilled workers, alternative wage for unskilled workers, plant size indicators based on the quartiles of the
employment distribution. The coefficients are available from author upon request.Table 10--Relative employment regressions with industry interactions
(dependent variable is ln(skilled to unskilled labor)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(capital) .072 ** .038** .041**
(.005) (.005) (.007)
ln(capital)*textiles -.008 .005 .004
(.008) (.007) (.011)
ln(capital)*wood -.014 -.007 -.002
(.010) (.009) (.013)
ln(capital)*paper .072** .040** .037**
(.013) (.011) (.016)
ln(capital)*chemicals .016 * .000 .012
(.009) (.008) (.0 13)
ln(capital)*glass .067 ** .033** .035*
(.014) (.012) (.018)
ln(capital)*basic metals .079 ** .061** .051**
(.015) (.013) (.019)
ln(capital)*machinery .061 ** .043** .035**
(.009) (.007) (.011)
ln(capital)*other manufacturing .029 .008 .048
(.021) (.017) (.036)
FTA Indicator .176 ** .083** .046**
(.021) (.017) (.018)
Patent Indicator .066 ** .019** .008
(.011) (.010) (.008)
Imported Materials Indicator .181 ** .086** .024**
(.013) (.011) (.011)
Plant Random Effects no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .31 .47 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a
5% and 10% level, respectively. N is 24,166 because some firms do not have any skilled
workers. FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. All specifications also includes
alternative wages and size distribution as regressors. Size indicators are based on quartiles
in the distribution of employment. Regression in column 2 and 3 also included the
following unreported regressors: share of executives and share of administrators in total
employment of skilled workers, share of women and share of production workers in total
employment, and corporation indicator. The coefficients are available from author upon
request.Appendix Table 1--Skill upgrading regressions
(dependent variable is employment share of skilled labor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital/Value added) .010 ** .013** .004** .005** .003** .005**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(Valueadded) .018 ** .014** .000 .004 ** .001** .003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTAIndicator .026 ** .009** .001 .022 ** .019** .009**
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
PatentIndicator .012 ** .005** .004** .002* .002 .001
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Imp.Materials Indicator .025 ** .007** -.002 .014 ** .011** .003*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
ShareofExecutives -.098 ** -.097** -.092**
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Shareof Administrators -.087 ** -.085** -.074**
(.003) (.003) (.002)
Shareof Women -.001 .001 .000
(.004) (.004) (.005)
ShareofProduction -.332 ** -.326** -.248**
Workers (.006) (.006) (.004)
Corporation Indicator .029 .032 **
(.002) (.003)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .36 na .75 .48 .48 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5%and10% level, respectively.
FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment of
skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 26,513. N is 24,166
in columns 3-5becausewe cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators in total
employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if they are
estimated using only 24,166 observations.Appendix Table 2--Skill upgrading regression
(dependent variable is employment share of skilled labor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital/Value add.) .011 ** .013** .004** .005** .003** .006**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(Valueadd.) .020 ** .014** .000 .005 ** .002** .003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTACost/Value Ad. .122 ** .032 .002 .073 ** .059** .016
(.038) (.022) (.023) (.031) (.028) (.020)
PatentCost/Value Ad. .002 * .000 .000 .000 .000 -.00 1
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Imp.Mat./Materials .057 ** .016** -.006 .039 ** .034** .007**
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Shareof Executives -.098 ** -.098** -.092**
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Shareof Administrators -.088 ** -.086** -.075**
(.003) (.003) (.002)
Shareof Women -.001 .001 .000
(.004) (.004) (.005)
Shareof Production -.3 33 ** -.327** -.248**
Workers (.006) (.006) (.004)
CorporationIndicator .030 ** .033**
(.002) (.003)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .35 na .75 .48 .48 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. **and*indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level,
respectively. FTAstandsfor foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in
total employment of skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N
is 26,513. N is 24,166 in columns 3-5 because we cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share
of administators in total employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change
significantly in columns 1-3 if they are estimated using only 24,166 observations.Appendix Table 3--Skill upgrading regressions with lagged value added
(dependent variable is share of skilled labor in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capitalfLaggedVA) .021 ** .031** .008** .014** .009** .017**
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(LaggedVA) .047 ** .039** .008** .031** .022** .021**
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTAlndicator .017 ** .009* -.003 .014 ** .005 .008 *
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005)
PatentIndicator .017 ** .006** .002 .006 ** .004 .001
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.002)
ImportedMaterials .046 ** .013**-.004 .034 ** .024** .009**
Indicator (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Share of Executives -.076 ** -.076**-.072**
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Shareof Administrators -.101 ** -.096 -.073
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Shareof Women .018 ** .023** .010
(.008) (.007) (.008)
ShareofProduction -.370 ** -.356**-.237**
Workers (.009) (.009) (.007)
Corporation Indicator .079 ** .082**
(.003) (.005)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .49 na .81 .54 .55 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.and *indicatesignificance at a 5%and10% level, respectively.
FTAstandsfor foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment
of skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 21,966. N is
20,166 in columns 3-5becausewe cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators
in total employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if
they are estimated using only 20,166 observations.Appendix Table 4--Skill upgrading regressions with lagged value added
(dependent variable is share of skilled labor in wage bill)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capitalfLaggedVA) .022 ** .031** .008** .015** .009** .017**
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(LaggedVA) .050 ** .040** .008** .033** .022** .022**
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTACost! LagVA. .000 .000 .000 .000 -.00 1 .000
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
PatentCostlLagVA .019 * .004 -.003 .016 ** .011** .002
(.010) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Imported.MatiMaterials .092 ** .036**-.002 .069 ** .056** .026**
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Shareof Executives -.078 ** -.076**-.072**
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Shareof Administrators -.102 -.097 -.073
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Shareof Women .017 ** .022** .010
(.008) (.007) (.008)
ShareofProduction -.372 ** -.356**-.237**
Workers (.009) (.009) (.007)
Corporation Indicator .081 ** .082**
(.003) (.005)
PlantIndicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .49 na .81 .54 .55 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.and *indicatesignificance at a 5%and10% level, respectively.
FTAstandsfor foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment
of skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 21,966. N is
20,166 in columns 3-5becausewe cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators
in total employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if
they are estimated using only 20,166 observations.Appendix Table 5--Skill upgrading regressions with lagged value added
(dependent variable is employment share of skilled labor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capitalfLaggedVA) .010 ** .015** .004** .004** .002** .005**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(LaggedVA) .019 ** .016** .001 .005 ** .001 .004 **
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTAlndicator .027 ** .009**-.001 .023 ** .020** .009**
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Patent Indicator .012 ** .005** .004** .002** .001 .001
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001)
ImportedMaterials .025 ** .007**-.003 .015 ** .011** .003*
Indicator (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Share of Executives -.099 ** -.099**-.096**
(.004) (.004) (.003)
Share of Administrators -.087 ** -.085**-.076**
(.003) (.003) (.002)
Share of Women .000 .002 .004
(.005) (.005) (.005)
ShareofProduction -.336** -.331**-.259**
Workers (.007) (.007) (.004)
Corporation Indicator .029** .032**
(.002) (.003)
Plant Indicators no no yes no no no
Plant Randomn Effects no yes no no no yes
Industry Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
YearIndicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .36 na .76 .48 .49 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.and *indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level, respectively.
FTAstandsfor foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment
of skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 21,966. N is
20,166 in columns 3-5 because we cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators
in total employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if
they are estimated using only 20,166 observations.Appendix Table 6--Skill upgrading regressions with lagged value added
(dependent variable is employment share of skilled labor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(capital/LaggedVA) .011 ** .015** .004** .005** .002** .005**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(LaggedVA) .021** .017** .001 .006 ** .002** .004**
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FTAC05tJLagVA. .000 .000 .000 -.001 ** -.001** .000
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Patent Cost/Lag VA .013** .004 .001 .010 ** .008** .002
(.006) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Imp. Mat./Materials .058 ** .014** -.011* .040** .035** .006*
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Share of Executives -.100** -.100** -.096**
(.004) (.004) (.003)
Share of Administrators -.087 -.086 -.076
(.003) (.003) (.002)
Shareof Women .000 .002 .004
(.005) (.005) (.005)
ShareofProduction 337 ** -.331** -.259**
Workers (.007) (.007) (.004)
CorporationIndicator .030 ** .032**
(.002) (.003)
Plant Indicators yes no yes no no no
PlantRandomn Effects no yes no no no yes
IndustryIndicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Area Indicators yes yes no yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (adjusted) .35 na .76 .48 .49 na
Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.and *indicatesignificance at a 5% and 10% level, respectively.
FTA stands for foreign technical assistance. Share of executives and administrators refers to their share in total employment of
skilled workers. Share of women and production workers refers to their share in total employment. N is 21,966. N is 20,166
in columns 3-5 because we cannot define additional variables such as share of executives and share of administators in total
employment of skilled workers for plants without skilled workers. No findings change significantly in columns 1-3 if they are
estimated using only 20,166 observations.